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Abstract
We argue, in the spirit of some of Jean-Yves Jaffray’s work, that explicitly incorporating
the information, however imprecise, available to the decision maker is relevant, feasible and
fruitful. In particular, we show that it can lead us to know whether the decision maker has
wrong beliefs and whether it matters or not, that it makes it possible to better model and
analyze how the decision maker takes into account new information, even when this infor-
mation is not an event and ﬁnally that it is crucial when attempting to identify and measure
the decision maker’s attitude toward imprecise information.
Journal of Economic Literature: B41,D80.
Introduction
When facing a decision under uncertainty, gathering information about the odds of
various events relevant to the outcome of the decision seems a good idea and indeed
is common practice. Jean-Yves Jaffray, trained as an engineer, also thought so. In-
deed, he made a distinction between complete ignorance, when no information is
available and situations in which some information is available, although not sufﬁ-
cient to pin down uniquely a probability distribution; situations he labeled “imprecise
risk”. This did not ﬁt in the traditional distinction between risk (covered by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern) and uncertainty (covered by Savage). Risk is too speciﬁc a
situation to be widely used, while Savage’s treatment of uncertainty (following the
subjectivist tradition of de Finetti) potentially misses some important data available
to the modeler.1
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1What is at stake is not so much the expected utility aspect of Savage’s theory (although we will also take
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 DOI : 10.1007/s11238-010-9197-4Jean-Yves Jaffray always advocated that decision theorists should develop prag-
matic tools to use all data available, in the most “objective way”, thus distancing
himself from a purely behavioral approach. This entails some cost as one sometimes
needs to take as granted the information available to the decision maker. But it also
entails gains, in terms of aid to decision making. It is also surprisingly very much
in line with common practice in economics, where situations of risk are commonly
assumed (e.g. industrial organization and incentive theory, in macroeconomics, la-
bor economics...), assuming, often implicitly, that enough information is available to
form these probabilistic beliefs. Jean-Yves Jaffray however wanted to also consider
situations where information does not come as a probability distribution. This stance
thus begs the question “how to handle available information, when it is not proba-
bilistic?” Jean-Yves Jaffray in his 1989 piece considered objects (belief functions)
that generalize usual probabilistic tools. He had to work hard to do so (see Wakker’s
piece in this issue) but the result is remarkably elegant.
In this short piece, would like to argue that this general approach to decision
making is 1) relevant, 2) feasible and 3) fruitful. We will almost exclusively focus
the discussion on static problems.
1 Why a theory incorporating available informa-
tion?
Why should one need a theory incorporating explicitly how available information
affects the decision maker’s choice? We already have vNM, which covers risky situ-
ations and hasn’t Savage proved that, in the end, decision making under uncertainty
can be reduced to the same expected utility criterion, only with subjective beliefs?
We can see two problems with this coherent but somewhat simplistic view of
decision theory under uncertainty. The ﬁrst is that subjective beliefs can be quite
arbitrary and hence the jump from saying that Savage and vNM criteria look alike to,
say, assuming the same subjective beliefs for all agents in a model is unwarranted.
The second is that even in relatively simple situations when some information is
available (e.g. Ellsberg) a decision maker may fail to come up with probabilistic
subjective beliefs and hence Savage’s nice construction might not apply in some
(most?) cases. Let’s take these two points in turn.
Let’s start with a somewhat provocative statement. There is, we claim, a kind of
folk theorem in economic theory saying that one could explain anything if one were
to allow arbitrary beliefs. And indeed from the rational expectations revolution to
various game theoretical equilibrium concepts, a lot of research has been dedicated
to make sure beliefs could not just be anything. But this concerns beliefs on endoge-









































0exogenous events, economic theory often makes the assumption of common proba-
bilistic beliefs among the agents. It rarely justiﬁes this assumption, or when it does,
invokes some principle according to which different beliefs would lead to inﬁnite
speculative trade, or in a different version, argue that decision makers with the same
information should hold the same beliefs. A statement that cannot be expressed us-
ing Savage’s framework (and is known to be ﬂawed even in a dynamic setting with
arrival of new, common, information –see Diaconis & Freedman (1986); Feldman
(1991).)
If two agents hold different probabilistic beliefs on some event, it has to be the
case that one is mistaken if one assumes an underlying “true” process, and economic
theory is not necessarily keen on deriving results on assumptions like that (although
less taboo nowadays given the strength of the behavioral approach). This might be a
rationale for actually assuming in a lot of models that agents all have the same proba-
bilistic beliefs, de facto reducing the situation to a situation of risk. Hence, we argue,
a good part of economic theory rests on this (very often implicit) assumption that the
setting under consideration is one of risk. This would thus justify our claim that part
of economic theory is based on the assumption that there is, in the background, some
probabilistic information available to all decision makers. Following this claim, one
could then wonder why this approach has (almost) not been generalized to non prob-
abilistic information. A possible answer goes back to the construction of Savage,
which gives a rationale for not bothering with say, sets of probabilities.
This brings us to our second point, raised above, which is of a different nature. It
criticizes the idea that under uncertainty, one can always come up with probabilistic
beliefs, be they subjective. Thus, the reduction to a setting of risk is not warranted.
However, failure to come up with probabilistic beliefs does not mean that there is no
structure on the beliefs of the agents.
So, there is room for a decision theory that would incorporate as a primitive the
information agentshave (in probabilistic or notprobabilistic ways) which generalizes
decisionunderriskanddoesnotnecessarilyreducetoit. Next, wearguethatthereare
ways to deal with available information even though it does not come as a probability
distribution, i.e., that the tools for such a theory already exist and can already be used
to study economic issues.
2 Imprecise risk and imprecise information
The idea of generalizing the notion of risk, i.e. known probability distribution, to
some notion of imprecise risk, i.e., imprecisely known probability distribution, dates
back to Jaffray (1989), who proposed to replace lotteries by belief functions, that









































0spirit of the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion (Arrow & Hurwicz, 1972). This idea was re-
cently revived by several authors who proposed to model imprecise risk either by ne-
cessity measures (R´ ebill´ e, 2006) or directly by sets of lotteries (Stinchcombe, 2003;
Olszewski, 2007; Ahn, 2008).
The above approach consists in assuming imprecise information on the distri-
bution of outcomes, and preferences over such imprecise lotteries. A different ap-
proach, pioneered by Wang (2001), is to consider that the DM has imprecise infor-
mation on the set of events, and preferences on pairs (f;P) where f is an act and
P is a set of probability distributions over the state space. This approach reduces
to the previous one only if one assumes that if two such pairs generate the same set
of lotteries, they are indifferent to the DM, so that the source of uncertainty does
not matter. Wang actually takes as primitives triples (f;P;P) where P is a ref-
erence prior. Wang’s main result is to provide axiomatic foundations for a general
version of the minimum relative entropy principle of Anderson et al. (1999). He also
characterizes a maxmin rule whereby the decision maker maximizes the minimum
expected utility with respect to the set of objective priors. This rule is characterized
by an axiom of aversion to uncertainty ` a la Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989), which, in his
framework takes the form of an axiom of strong aversion to objective ambiguity. It
says that the decision maker should always prefer an act in a situation characterized
by a set of prior to the same act in a situation characaterized by a set of prior that
would be a superset of the former. In the same setting, Gajdos et al. (2004) weaken
the notion of aversion to objective ambiguity, that they call aversion to imprecision,
and obtain a generalized maxmin rule: the decision maker maximizes the minimum
expected utility over a subset '(P) of the set of initial priors. One special case of
this model is a form of perturbed expected utility, given by the formula
V (f;P;P) = (1   ")
Z
u  fdP + " min
P2P
Z
u  fdP; (1)
a model that was ﬁrst proposed by Ellsberg in order to rationalize the behavior de-
scribed in his seminal paper. It also appears in Tapking (2004) in the context of
the study of updating rules for capacities. Gajdos et al. (2008) generalizes Gajdos
et al. (2004) by dispensing with the reference prior, now part of the representation.
Kopylov (2006) provides alternative foundations for the perturbed expected utility
formula, characterizing it by an axiom that can be interpreted as a combination of
ambiguity aversion and loss aversion. In the same setting, Giraud (2009) provides
an axiomatization for nonadditive second order beliefs over P, that serve for the
aggregation of the various expected utilities of an act f under information P. The
analogous of '(P) is here a nonadditive probability P on the state space.
Nehring (2007, 2009) studies a related framework where, along with the usual









































0comparative likelihood relation, that is assumed to represent the decision maker’s
beliefs, but that could just as well be interpreted it as available information, betting
preferences being interpreted as revealed beliefs. The object of investigation is the
compatibility of betting preferences as derived from the preference relation with the
decision maker’s beliefs represented by the comparative likelihood relation.
Finally, Gilboa et al. (Forth.a) also distinguish two preference relations, one of
which, potentially incomplete, is interpreted as preferences based on “hard informa-
tion”, and the other, a completion of the former, is revealed by actual choices. They
provide an axiomatic derivation of a maxmin expected utility representation for the
revealed preferences relation with respect to a set of priors that represents the “ob-
jective” preference relation.
3 Fruitfulness of the approach
Taking into account available information allows one to deal with three important
issues that cannot be addressed otherwise. First, incorporating available information
can lead us to know whether the decision maker has wrong beliefs and how this does
or does not matter. Second, incorporating available information makes it possible to
bettermodelandanalyzehowthedecisionmakertakesintoaccountnewinformation,
even when this information is not an event. Thirdly, it is crucial when identifying and
measuring the decision maker’s attitude toward imprecise information.
3.1 Are Rational Beliefs Reasonable?
Savage’s project, when writing the Foundations of Statistics was, among other things,
to provide axioms for a rational behavior in the presence of uncertainty. He often
identiﬁed rationality with a form of consistency, as exempliﬁed by axioms P2 and P4.
If we accept the deﬁnition of rationality as consistency, and if by beliefs we mean
beliefs revealed by the decision maker’s willingness to bet, then beliefs satisfying P2
and P4 must be rational.
However, there are other ways of deﬁning the rationality of beliefs. One is to
ask whether they contradict some information available at least to the observer. If
they don’t, we might call them rational, or, at least, reasonable. An example of
unreasonable beliefs occurs if the decision maker is willing to bet on the fact that
I am the king of France, while abiding by Savage’s principles. Sen’s concept of
“rational fool”, though used in a different context, seems to apply, since believing
things that are not true is a step in the direction of insanity. The point is here that
in Savage’s framework it is not possible to distinguish between rational fools and
people in their right mind, whether rational in Savage’s sense or not.2 For that, we









































0need an explicit formalization of the information available to the decision maker.
Things are actually a little more complicated than that, since we have to distin-
guish different kind of unreasonable beliefs:
 Beliefs that contradict information that is available to the modeler but not to
the DM.
 Beliefs that contradict information known by the modeler to be available to the
DM.
In the ﬁrst case, it is difﬁcult to say whether the DM is being reasonable or not
by holding these beliefs: it would be to some extent unfair to qualify these beliefs as
unreasonable, even though they are known by the modeler to be wrong. Consider for
example a tribe that has lived for centuries away from western civilization and holds
some beliefs about biology (e.g. that ingesting sperm will help a boy to become a
man, the rationale of many initiation rites) that to a certain extent make sense given
its state of knowledge even though they are wrong.
The second case, on the other hand, does not seem ambiguous: it is really unrea-
sonable to known something to be true, and not to act accordingly (i.e., in Savage’s
framework, to prefer betting on events known to have low probability rather than
on events known to have high probability). This kind of behavior has received a
lot of attention in the philosophical literature since Aristotle, under the name of the
“weakness of the will” problem: I know what is good for me, yet I don’t do it. In
the decision-theoretic literature, this problem is often studied in the context of pref-
erences over menus, with beliefs not playing a decisive role. But there is an obvious
connection between this problem and the contradiction between available informa-
tion and beliefs revealed by choices. This is implicit in the analysis of this problem in
terms of sequential decision: consider the problem of starting an addictive behavior.
I might do it, deceiving myself into believing that I will be able to stop when I want
to, even though there is plenty of information around telling that I will not. It seems
that a fully rational DM will know that, and never start.
There are however arguments that suggests that things might not be that clear
afterall. Thesearguments, broughtforthinpaperssuchasAkerlof&Dickens(1982),
Brunnermeier & Parker (2005) and Gollier (2005), go along the following line: it
might be optimal to deceive oneself in order to feel better overall, even though that
might increase the risk of experiencing damages. For instance, I may choose to
underestimate the probability to be contaminated by the HIV in order to better enjoy
sex, even though that may lead me to engage in more dangerous sexual practices.
To the extent that these wrong beliefs, or illusions, are chosen to optimize some
Gilboa and coauthors in a series of papers (Gilboa et al., 2008, 2009, Forth.b; Gilboa, 2009). Our focus
here is however slightly different, since we want to emphasize that there is a way out of this, while in these









































0overall well-being criterion, they are not irrational from the point of view of standard
economic theory, although they might be deemed unreasonable.
One last important issue here is the question of how much does the DM trust
the information available to him. Distrust would be revealed by choices as some
discrepancy between information and behavior, and may be considered rational, if
the DM has good reasons to distrust the information, e.g. when it comes from experts
known to be unreliable. But this means that the DM has private information, and begs
the question: how is the observer/modeler to treat private information?
All this boils down to the deeper question of the status of what is sometimes
called “objective” information. One possible deﬁnition of objective information is
one over which there is no possible disagreement. Information that not everyone
trusts doesn’t count as objective, therefore, as long as the distrust is based on reli-
able evidence. If we adopt a weaker deﬁnition of “objective” as meaning: beliefs
that are not derived from the DM’s observed behavior, then obviously this allows for
some discrepancy between objective information and revealed beliefs that is not nec-
essarily irrational or unreasonable. Therefore it is essential, for the interpretation of
decision models, to have a perfectly clear interpretation of the primitive that model
available information.
3.2 Attitude Toward New Information
Modeling available information has also some advantage when dealing with arrival
of new information. This information may or may not be describable as an event
of the state space. For instance consider the case where ambiguity stems from the
unsettled debate between experts on a scientiﬁc issue, say the appropriateness of a
large scale vaccination against inﬂuenza A. Assume that each expert comes up with
a probability distribution over side-effects, and the DM is the government that must
make a decision about whether to start the vaccination campaign or not. Consider
now two pieces of information. The ﬁrst is that one side-effect that was deemed
possible by some and not by others actually occurs in a randomized experiment.
This is an event. The second is that one of the experts dies (or, less tragically, that
two experts decide to form an association and to submit only one estimate). This is
not an event. However it is obviously an ambiguity reducing information, and should
matter to the DM.
If new information is not describable as an event, then in the purely subjectivist
theory there is no way to model how the DM deals with it. On the other hand,
if we model available information as a set of probability distributions, and if new
information comes as a new set of distributions, the revision of beliefs becomes a
simple matter. It sufﬁces to replace the previous information set P by the new one










































3.3 Measure of imprecision aversion
Various models have been proposed to deal with situations where information is too
scarce to pin down a single probability distribution. One prominent model is Gilboa
& Schmeidler (1989)’s Maxmin Expected Utility. The interpretation of the set of
priors in this model is not obvious, however. If the revealed set of priors coincides,
so to speak, with the actual objective information, taking decisions on the basis of
the smallest expected utility is an extremely pessimistic, perhaps unreasonable, at-
titude, as noticed in Wang (2003) and discussed in section 2. But, if the revealed
set of priors is actually much smaller than the maximal one compatible with the
available information, then taking the minimum expected utility with respect to this
smaller set is not that pessimistic after all. There is no way one can settle this with-
out knowing what exactly this set of priors is, and in the context of fully subjective
axiomatizations, we simply cannot do it for lack of a sufﬁciently rich setup. It must
be noted, incidentally, that Ghirardato et al. (2004)’s axiomatization of a general-
ization of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989)’s model designed to differentiate ambiguity
and ambiguity attitude and hence immune to the accusation of excessive pessimism
allows only (as the authors make perfectly clear) to differentiate between revealed
ambiguity and attitude toward revealed ambiguity, since it is cast in exactly the same
setup as Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989)’s, and cannot therefore completely succeed in
settling down the controversy.
This interpretational problem translates into a measurement problem if one does
notincorporateavailableinformation. Andindeed, inexperimentalwork, oneusually
uses the available information to try to capture or measure ambiguity attitude (see
e.g., Halevy (2007) or Ahn et al. (2008)).
In Jean-Yves Jaffray’s 1989 model of imprecise risk, such an interpretational is-
sue does not arise. Since the set of priors coincide by construction with the available
information, the coefﬁcient weighting the minimum expected utility is a coefﬁcient
of pessimism. In a similar vein, in Gajdos et al. (2008), introducing explicitly the in-
formation available to the decision maker makes it possible to deﬁne concepts related
to attitude toward imprecision, such as comparative aversion to bet imprecision, and
to show that a decision maker a is more averse to bet imprecision than b if and only
if 'b(P)  'a(P). Moreover, in the so-called “contraction model” of equation (1)
with endogenous P, it is shown that a is more averse to bet imprecision than b if and
only if "a  "b. " is also shown to be interpretable as a “relative imprecision aver-
sion premium”. Similarly, in Giraud (2009) it is shown that a is more averse to bet




b , i.e. if b always has a higher willingness
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